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The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
Throughout the 1990s, tens of thousands of Australian taxpayers invested in mass-
marketed tax effective schemes. They enjoyed generous tax breaks until the Australian 
Taxation Office (Tax Office) told them in 1998 that they abused the system. This study 
examines the circumstances surrounding taxpayers’ decision to invest in scheme 
arrangements. It also explores investors’ perceptions of the way the Tax Office handled the 
schemes issue and, perhaps more importantly, why such a large number of investors defied 
the Tax Office’s demands that they pay back taxes. Data were taken from in-depth 
interviews conducted with 29 scheme investors. Consistent with the procedural justice 
literature, the findings revealed that many of the scheme investors interviewed defied the 
Tax Office’s demands because the procedures the Tax Office used to handle the situation 
were perceived to be unfair. Given these findings, it will be argued that to effectively shape 
desired behaviour, regulators will need to move beyond enforcement strategies linked 
purely to deterrence. A strategy that aims to emphasise the procedural justice aspects of a 
regulatory encounter will be discussed. 
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Procedural justice and tax compliance 
Kristina Murphy 
 
Introduction 
 
Why people choose to obey or disobey decisions made by institutions has been the topic of 
much psychological research since the late 1950s (for example, Easton, 1958; French & 
Raven, 1959; Tyler, 1990; 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Two quite different theories that 
attempt to explain non-compliant behaviour have come out of that work; they are the 
rational choice model and the attitudinal model. The rational choice model, on the one 
hand, has tended to dominate the formulation of public policy in areas as diverse as 
criminal justice, welfare policy, and taxation. The model argues that people are motivated 
entirely by profit seeking. They assess opportunities and risks and disobey the law when 
the anticipated fine and probability of being caught are small in relation to the profits to be 
made through non-compliance (for a discussion see Kagan & Scholz, 1984). Advocates of 
the rational choice model therefore believe that individuals or firms will only comply with 
an authority’s rules and decisions when confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties.  
 
While some research supports the view that deterrence measures can affect compliance 
behaviour (for example, Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Williams, 2001; Witte & Woodbury, 
1985), other more recent research suggests that the effects of threat and legal coercion can 
sometimes be counterproductive (for example, Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Blumenthal, 
Christian & Slemrod, 1998; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Murphy, 2002a). In fact, 
research into reactance has shown that the use of threat and coercion, particularly when 
perceived as illegitimate, can produce the opposite behaviour from that sought. In other 
words, these actions are more likely to result in non-compliance or overt opposition 
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981). In response to findings such as these, a number of researchers 
have instead suggested that attitudes and moral obligations, in addition to purely economic 
calculations or fear of punishment, are important in explaining compliance behaviour and 
therefore need to be considered when managing non-compliance (for example, 
Braithwaite, 2002; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). This is the basis for the attitudinal model of 
compliance.  
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According to Tyler and Smith (1998), people’s behaviour is strongly linked to views about 
justice and injustice. Procedural justice in particular concerns the perceived fairness of the 
procedures involved in decision-making and the perceived treatment one receives from the 
decision maker. The procedural justice literature demonstrates that people’s reactions to 
their personal experiences with authorities are rooted in their evaluations of the fairness of 
procedures those agencies use to exercise their authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2000; 
2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000).  
 
In fact, there is evidence to show that people who feel they have been treated fairly by an 
organisation will be more likely to trust that organisation and be inclined to accept its 
decisions and follow its directions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Murphy, 2002a; Tyler & Degoey, 
1996). It has also been found that people are most likely to challenge a situation 
collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair. For example, in a study of 
work tasks, student participants complained more to a third-party authority figure when 
they were treated unfairly and received an unfavourable outcome (Greenberg, 1987). The 
same study also showed that students were most likely to take collective action when the 
procedural injustice they experienced reflected institutional policy than when it reflected 
the actions of a single person. Research has consistently shown that individuals seek justice 
in a number of ways when they feel that the groups to which they belong have been treated 
unfairly (for an in-depth discussion of this topic see Tyler & Smith, 1998). These ways can 
include pursuing collective change in ways that are socially acceptable (for example, 
political lobbying), or turning to third parties to intervene on their behalf (for example, 
taking a class action, referring the decisions to the courts). 
 
The procedural justice literature specifically highlights the importance of an authority’s 
trustworthiness, interpersonal respect, and neutrality in its dealings with others (Tyler, 
1989; 1994; 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1998). One’s judgment about whether or not an 
authority is motivated to treat them in a fair way, to be concerned about their needs, and to 
consider their arguments (that is, their trustworthiness) has been shown to be the primary 
factor that people consider when evaluating authorities (Tyler & Degoey, 1996; Tyler & 
Lind, 1992). If people believe that an authority is ‘trying’ to be fair and to deal fairly with 
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them, they trust the motives of that authority and develop a long-term commitment to 
accepting its decisions. 
 
Research has also shown that being treated politely, with dignity and respect, and having 
genuine respect shown for one’s rights and social status, all enhance feelings of fairness. 
Tyler (1997) has specifically shown that people value respectful treatment by authorities 
and view those authorities that treat them with respect as more entitled to be obeyed. 
People are also influenced by judgments of the neutrality of decision-making procedures. 
Neutrality includes assessments of honesty, impartiality, and the use of fact, not personal 
opinions, in decision-making. People basically seek a level playing field in which no one is 
unfairly advantaged. As people are seldom in the position to know the correct outcome 
until it is actually made, they focus on the evidence that the procedures are even-handed.  
 
Within political psychology, procedural justice is widely hypothesised to be an antecedent 
of legitimacy. Researchers (for example, Magner, Sobery & Welker, 1998; Tyler, 1997; 
Tyler & Lind, 1992) have shown that people who feel they have been fairly treated by an 
authority regard their authority status as more legitimate; and this is regardless of the 
decision outcome. Tyler (1997) goes on to argue that if an organisation is perceived to be 
legitimate then people are generally more likely to follow and accept their decisions. 
 
Critics of the procedural justice view have suggested that people would care more about 
the favourability of their outcomes (for example, how much money they stand to lose) and 
less about fairness when the stakes are high. Research has not supported that argument, 
however. Instead, it has been shown that concerns about fairness remain high even when 
outcomes are important (Casper, Tyler & Fisher, 1988; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose & de Vera 
Park, 1993). For example, in a study of authorities in political, legal, managerial, 
educational, and family settings, Tyler (1997) found that authorities draw an important part 
of their legitimacy from their social relationship with group members. Specifically, Tyler 
showed that poor treatment by authorities affected views about their overall legitimacy, not 
judgments about gain or loss.  
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Justice in the taxation context 
 
While the literature indicates that government regulators can benefit by employing fair 
procedures, little empirical research has been conducted on the effects of procedural justice 
on tax compliance. Of the research that has been conducted, it has been shown that 
taxpayers are generally more compliant when they think they have been treated fairly and 
respectfully by a tax authority. For example, Alm, Jackson and McKee (1993) investigated 
whether procedural aspects of a decision about how tax revenue should be spent affected 
tax compliance. As predicted, it was found that student taxpayers, who were tested in an 
experimental setting, were more likely to respond positively—and so to increase their tax 
compliance—when faced with a tax expenditure program that they selected themselves. 
When the decision was imposed upon them, compliance suffered. In a Swiss study, Feld 
and Frey (2002) presented empirical evidence to suggest that actual tax compliance 
increased when taxpayers were treated as trustworthy in the first instance by tax 
authorities. In a study of Australian taxpayers, Wenzel (2002) also studied the impact of 
justice perceptions, but this time on self-reported tax compliance. Using a survey 
methodology, Wenzel found that taxpayers were more compliant when they thought that 
they had been treated fairly and respectfully by the Tax Office. Worsham (1996), however, 
failed to find an increase in tax non-compliance when taxpayers experienced procedural 
injustice. Using an experimental manipulation, Worsham (1996) found that procedural 
injustice experienced personally, either by being subject to inconsistency in enforcement or 
to enforcement attempts brought about by inaccurate information, did not increase the level 
of tax non-compliance. He did, however, find that procedural injustice experienced 
indirectly through becoming aware of another’s unfair treatment did increase self-reported 
tax non-compliance.  
 
Although not directly testing the effects of procedural justice on tax compliance, Stalans 
and Lind (1997) compared how taxpayers and their tax preparers judged the procedural 
fairness of tax audits and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Seventy taxpayers 
participated in interviews after the completion of their tax audits and were asked to 
describe their impressions of the audit and the auditor, and to rate how satisfied they were 
with the auditors’ treatment and fairness. Both taxpayers and representatives who viewed 
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audits as a procedure that should indicate the truth about the accuracy of their return, were 
less satisfied with how the auditor treated them. In addition, they were less likely to think 
that the auditor tried to be fair when compared to representatives who viewed the audit 
process as a way of achieving the best outcome for their clients. After completion of the 
audit, taxpayers were also asked about their views toward the IRS. In general, it was found 
that taxpayers thought the IRS treated honest taxpayers like they had done something 
wrong. 
 
Coupled with the other studies in the procedural justice literature, these tax studies in 
general suggest that individuals do not react to authorities primarily or exclusively in terms 
of what they do or do not receive from those authorities. Instead, they react to how they are 
treated. If individuals trust the motives of authorities, feel that they behave neutrally, and 
feel treated with respect and dignity, it appears that they will be more willing to defer to 
authorities and obey their decisions (see Tyler, 1990).  
 
The present study 
 
The aim of the present study is to explore whether possible feelings of procedural injustice 
may have led a group of approximately 42 000 Australian taxpayers to actively resist the 
Tax Office’s demands that they pay back a tax debt. In brief, throughout the 1990s tens of 
thousands of Australian taxpayers ‘invested’ in mass-marketed tax effective schemes (for 
an example of the schemes referred to in this paper see Appendix). Their investments 
provided them with combined tax deductions exceeding four billion Australian dollars. The 
Tax Office maintained that investments in these arrangements were largely funded through 
tax deductions and claimed that little private capital was at risk. The Tax Office therefore 
came to the conclusion in 1998 that taxpayers who invested in these schemes did so for the 
‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining a tax benefit and, as a result, the anti-avoidance 
provisions of Part IVA of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applied. The 
Tax Office moved to disallow scheme related tax deductions claimed up to six years 
earlier, and issued amended assessments to all taxpayers involved in schemes. Scheme 
investors were told that they had to immediately pay back taxes with interest and 
appropriate penalties or they would run the risk of facing the full extent of the law.  
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Investor reaction toward the Tax Office’s decision to disallow previous years’ scheme-
related tax deductions came as somewhat of a surprise to the Tax Office. The majority of 
investors claimed that the schemes they invested in had been sold to them, in many cases 
by their accountants, as a way of legally minimising tax. Many investors therefore believed 
that they had done nothing wrong by investing in these schemes and actively resisted the 
Tax Office’s demands that they pay back tax. At the time of starting fieldwork for this 
study in October 2001 — three and a half years after amended assessments had been issued 
— more than 50 percent of scheme investors had still refused to enter into settlement 
arrangements with the Tax Office to pay back their tax debts. The possible reasons behind 
this subsequent non-compliance are therefore of interest to the present study.  
 
It should be noted at this point, however, that it is not the aim of the present study to 
discuss the legal issues surrounding the mass-marketed schemes issue. Instead, using in-
depth qualitative interviews conducted with scheme investors, the present study only 
attempts to provide a possible explanation to why the majority of scheme investors reacted 
in such a negative way toward the Tax Office’s handling of the issue.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
In-depth interviews were conducted with 29 scheme investors from and around the 
goldfields town of Kalgoorlie, Western Australia. Interviews were conducted in the 
Kalgoorlie area because of the large number of residents known to be involved in tax 
effective schemes. Figures obtained from the Tax Office indicate that approximately 600 
taxpayers from Kalgoorlie and its immediate surroundings invested in tax schemes. The 
investors interviewed were considered to be typical investors from the goldfields region, in 
that they came from middle-class working families1.  
 
                                                 
1 The goldfields region of Western Australia is recognised for its prominence in the mining industry, with 
approximately 22 percent of the total workforce employed in this industry (Department of Local Government 
and Regional Development, 2001). Given that incomes earned by most miners place them into the highest 
possible tax bracket, the region provided a lucrative pool for promoters who marketed tax avoidance 
schemes. 
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Procedure 
 
Interviews were conducted over a two-week period in October 2001. The semi-structured 
interviews averaged approximately one hour and explored the circumstances that led 
participants to invest in scheme arrangements, respondents’ experiences with the Tax 
Office, and their beliefs about the Tax Office and its procedures.  
 
In order to find an adequate number of scheme investors to interview, a ‘snowball’ 
technique was used. Initially, community groups in the mining town of Kalgoorlie were 
contacted and briefed about the aim of the project. The names of investors who were 
particularly vocal in the community were then provided. These investors then suggested 
the names of additional investors who they thought might be interested in participating in 
the study. Approximately 90 percent of those contacted by telephone agreed to participate 
and several additional investors also volunteered to participate in the study during the 
course of the two-week period. All interviews were tape-recorded for subsequent 
transcription and analysis, but at the request of one investor, his interview was not tape-
recorded. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
While it is acknowledged that only 29 investors living in the goldfields region were 
interviewed, the situation surrounding their outstanding debt was quite varied. Two 
investors had already fully paid back their outstanding tax debt, two investors had or were 
attempting to enter into payment settlements with the Tax Office, five had either filed for 
bankruptcy or were seriously considering the option, eleven had joined fighting funds in an 
attempt to absolve them of any debt, six were waiting to see the outcome of various court 
cases before deciding what to do2, two stated that they refused to pay the bill, and there 
was one who simply chose to ignore the situation. 
                                                 
2 Several court cases relating to various tax effective schemes have been conducted over the past few years. 
Three have so far confirmed the Tax Office’s interpretation of tax law that scheme related tax deductions 
were not allowable under Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (see Howland-Rose & Ors vs. 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 246, (2002) 49 ATR 206, 2002 ATC 4200; Puzey vs. Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 1171, 50 ATR 595; Vincent vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation  
(2002) FCA 656, 50 ATR 20) and one has confirmed the investors’ interpretation of tax law that they are 
allowable (see Sleight vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation  (2003) FCA 896). 
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How did investors first hear about the schemes? 
 
Participants were asked to explain how they first came to hear about the schemes they 
invested in. One investor explained how they had seen a pamphlet in their letterbox. To 
hear more about the investment, they then contacted the ‘financial adviser’ whose name 
was printed on the pamphlet. Eleven other investors initially got the idea from a friend or 
family member, eight from their accountant or financial advisor, and nine from a door-to-
door salesman promoting the product (in some cases this salesman was a financial 
planner).  
 
Of particular interest was the finding that 25 of the 29 investors interviewed said they 
sought additional independent advice from a third party as to the legitimacy of the scheme 
arrangements they were about to invest in. For example, 25 investors said they sought 
advice from their accountants or solicitors. Some of these investors said they also sought 
additional advice from the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the Tax 
Office3. One investor made the following point about the advice he received from his 
accountant: 
 
When you’ve got a CPA who knows the tax law saying, ‘This is a sound 
investment, there’s no problem with it’, then why wouldn’t you do it? 
 
In fact, one investor explained the reason why he had used a tax agent:  
 
I thought that if an accountant did your tax you were less likely to be audited 
because the tax accountant themselves went through a reasonable amount of due 
process to make sure it was all ridgy didge and above board. 
 
Similar comments were provided by most of the other investors interviewed. Many 
investors therefore thought they took the correct steps to check the legitimacy of the 
schemes in which they invested. Most believed that they had done all that was possible and 
                                                 
3 From the interviews, however, it is not clear what advice they were given from the Tax Office, as the Tax 
Office does not give financial advice over the telephone.  
 
 9
expected of them under Australia’s self-assessment system4. They were therefore surprised 
when the Tax Office later disallowed their deductions and penalised them for ‘avoiding’ 
their taxes.  
 
Reason for investing 
 
The draw card of many investments is that they proffer the opportunity to legally minimise 
tax. In a study of Australian taxpayers, Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns & Graham (2001) 
found that approximately 22 percent of taxpayers look at several different ways of 
minimising their tax each year. While many of the scheme investors interviewed 
acknowledged that they entered into scheme arrangements because the touted tax breaks 
were attractive, they were adamant that they did not enter the schemes for the dominant 
purpose of avoiding tax. Investors asserted that the schemes they had invested in had been 
sold to them, sometimes by their accountants, as a way that they could legally minimise the 
tax they were required to pay while still being involved in a viable long-term investment5. 
One investor mentioned the conversation he had with his accountant before investing in tax 
schemes: 
 
I suppose I had been going to my tax agent, and I’ve been concerned that I’ve been 
paying that much tax. I don’t mind paying tax, you know, but I’ve been concerned 
that I’ve been probably paying more than I should have so I’ve been asking him 
questions about it and he said there’s a couple of investments you can go and invest 
in. And he put a couple forward to me and I said, ‘I’m not interested in those’. I 
specifically said, ‘I don’t want to go into anything that’s illegal. It’s got to be ridgy-
didge’.  
 
                                                 
4 In 1986, the Tax Office introduced a self-assessment system to taxation. Under this system all taxpayers 
lodge a tax return containing detailed information and calculations of their taxable income. Returns are not 
subjected to technical scrutiny, but are accepted at face value. All onus of responsibility is therefore placed 
on the taxpayer to prepare an accurate return. Audit activity is then primarily used post assessment to check 
the accuracy of some returns (D’Ascenzo & Poulakis, 2002).  
5 Some people still question investors’ underlying motivations, however, based on the argument that the 
investments they entered into seemed ‘too good to be true’. In retrospect, this might be the case. But as can 
be seen in this study, the majority of investors interviewed sought advice from their accountants as to the 
legitimacy of the investments. They were therefore led to believe that the investments were legitimate and 
above board. 
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When asked about whether he had questioned his accountant about the tax benefits offered 
by the schemes he got involved in, the same interviewee later said: 
 
I asked about the tax on it and I said ‘What’s the deal with the tax here? Is that still 
legitimate?’ And I was told yes. So I just took that attitude and okay, it’s no big 
deal. My tax accountant thinks it’s okay, why wouldn’t I?  
 
This comment highlights the trust taxpayers place in their tax agents. It also emphasises the 
importance that tax agents play in taxpayer compliance, and in this case, non-compliance. 
In a survey study of Australian taxpayers, Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) discussed how 
taxpayers open to low-risk tax minimisation strategies often find themselves with tax 
agents who serve taxpayers open to high-risk minimisation strategies (see also Murphy & 
Byng, 2002). Tax agents are usually expected to correctly interpret the level of risk their 
clients are willing to take and are also expected to judge what is acceptable minimisation 
behaviour. As can be seen from the comments made by the investor above, often this does 
not occur. Tax agents tend to be more adventurous than their clients in thinking a particular 
minimisation strategy will be upheld by a subsequent legal challenge (Hansen, Crosser & 
Laufer, 1992). Thus, what is high risk for a taxpayer may be considered low risk for a tax 
agent6.  
 
Whilst aware of the taxation benefits arising from the initial investment, many investors 
reported that they believed these benefits were acceptable to the Tax Office because they 
were more than outweighed by the potential tax on future returns. As one investor said 
about his investment, ‘We were making money on it and we’re paying the tax on it’.  
 
Some investors said that they saw investing in their schemes as a way to support Australian 
business. As can be seen from the following quote, one investor actually said that investing 
in a forestry scheme was a good way to redirect her taxes into rural areas:  
 
                                                 
6 In a survey of the general population, Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns & Graham (2001) found that 
approximately five percent of taxpayers reported that their tax agents had recommended complicated tax 
schemes to them that would enable them to avoid tax. It therefore appears from this figure that approximately 
five percent of tax agents are aggressive in nature. 
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We were also told that our tax money was getting channelled into the country areas; 
it was a way of directing our tax into the country areas where people would be 
employed. And coming from a country area, I thought that was right-on. For me it 
was doing something with our taxes other than paying people who don’t want to 
work. 
 
In addition, many investors commented on how they were trying to set themselves up for 
retirement. As one investor noted:  
 
I figured there will be no such thing as a pension by the time I retire. So, I mean, 
how do you live? You’ve got to have something. 
 
With the pension slowly being phased out in Australia, and the government encouraging 
Australians to ‘look after themselves’ in retirement, one could argue that there is little 
wonder why so many people were being lured by investments which required no initial 
cash outlay.  
 
So while it is acknowledged that some scheme participants may have invested in schemes 
to avoid tax, it should be noted that all of the investors interviewed in the present study 
said they were led to invest based on trust in the proposals marketed to them. In some 
cases, the proposals were marketed by respected accountants and financial advisers. Thus, 
it is proposed that the subsequent reaction by such a large number of investors to defy the 
Tax Office’s demands that they pay back taxes may have been due to the way the Tax 
Office initially handled the schemes issue. This idea is explored in more detail in the 
following section. 
 
Procedural justice and the Tax Office 
 
Government agencies such as the Tax Office often find themselves attempting to elicit 
certain behaviours (for example, pay your fair share of tax) in order to obtain what they see 
as a solution to a given social problem (for example, funding services). These attempts to 
elicit or change a particular behaviour sometimes involve persuasion and sometimes 
involve more or less coercive tactics. As discussed in detail in the Introduction to this 
paper, if people believe that an authority is trying to be fair and to deal fairly with them, 
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they will trust the motives of that authority and be more inclined to follow its directions 
and decisions.  
 
Tax Office communication 
 
As discussed by Wenzel (2001), letters are probably the most frequently and broadly 
applied measure that the Tax Office uses to communicate and gain compliance from non-
compliant taxpayers. These letters, however, have often been regarded as too technical. For 
example, in a performance audit of the Tax Office, the Australian Auditor-General found 
that Tax Office letters to taxpayers were 25 percent more difficult to read than what was 
recommended (Australian National Audit Office, 2001). The Auditor-General therefore 
suggested that the Tax Office work to improve its communication with taxpayers by 
improving the reading ease of letters and documents sent to clients. 
 
The letters that the Tax Office sent to scheme investors were also regarded by those 
interviewed to be too technical. The following comment, provided by one investor, 
supports this claim: 
 
And the letters you get from the ATO. You know, like, as I said, an average 
educated person won’t be able to construe the terms they’re using there. I mean, 
they’re just over my head … They just baffle you.  
 
Tax Office letters sent to scheme investors were also seen to be unsympathetic and 
threatening. As can be seen from the following quote, the Tax Office’s procedure of 
sending a large number of amended tax assessments several days before Christmas was 
seen to be particularly callous and unsympathetic: 
 
MALE: When I got the first letter from the ATO. 
FEMALE: Christmas 2000, wasn’t it? 
MALE: It would be something like that, wouldn’t it? I said, ‘Oh, this is a fantastic 
Christmas present’, you know? Really livened my Christmas up for me. 
 
On talking about the timing of the letters, the following investor said: 
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The timing of the letter wasn’t anything but the fact of the way it was written, 
‘Righto, you’ve got 14 days to pay ... or this will take place. We’ll start recovery 
action’. And you go, ‘Hang on, what’s all this mean’. 
 
The technical language and demands used in the letters therefore left investors feeling 
overwhelmed, confused and angry. Many investors also expressed anger at the lack of 
consultation and warning they personally received before being issued with letters telling 
them that their deductions had been disallowed. The Tax Office’s initial failure to advise 
investors of the settlement provisions, debt recovery policies and hardship relief measures 
offered by the Tax Office was also met with disappointment. As one investor commented:  
 
I’m really disappointed with them … they don’t offer to help, maybe if they’d 
offered a payment plan or something to ease the burden of this big bill you know 
like and not put all this - keep putting this interest on, it’s just ridiculous. I mean 
that would have been heaps easier than you’re a tax cheat, you’ve got to pay        
$40 000 now or we’re going to put all this interest on it, you’d just never get it paid.  
 
This investor therefore felt that the Tax Office had not been helpful in looking for a 
cooperative and fair solution. Even when investors actively sought help by calling the Tax 
Office contact number given in their letters, they said it was not forthcoming. As one 
investor said: 
 
You can ring the ATO five times in a week and ask the same question and get five 
different answers. 
 
To make matters worse, many scheme investors felt that the Tax Office letters sent to them 
implied that they were ‘tax cheats’ by stating that their dominant purpose for entering into 
a scheme arrangement was to avoid tax. So although the Tax Office did not actually use 
the words ‘tax cheat’, many investors believed that it was implied. As can be seen from the 
comments provided by three investors below, this perception was met with intense anger 
and dissatisfaction with the Tax Office:  
 
As far as I am concerned, I’ve been really really badly treated by the ATO. They’ve 
just seen me as a tax evader. No worrying about my circumstances or my reasons 
for going into it or anything. They’ve just nailed me. 
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It’s pretty damn rude to give me a tax return and then say, ‘Bad luck, by the way 
you’re doing something illegal. Actually you’re a tax cheat.’ 
 
It [the letter] had all these things about schemes and you’re fraudulent and 
whatever, and I just saw red.  
 
Why investors reacted so strongly to the ‘apparent’ accusations in the letters might relate to 
their perceptions of justice. Perceptions of justice have been found to be strongly related to 
feelings of self-worth and self-concept (for example, Tyler & Smith, 1998). Tyler and 
Smith (1998, p. 596) noted that individuals use the justice of their social experiences to 
define and evaluate the status of their group and within that group their social standing, 
their self-worth and their self-concept. Research conducted in Australia has shown that 
most Australian taxpayers express pride in being a member of the group called ‘honest 
taxpayers’ (Braithwaite et al., 2001). Most investors also considered themselves to be 
honest taxpayers (see also Murphy & Byng, 2002). As one investor said: 
 
I’ve been in the mining game for probably nearly nine or ten years now, so in that 
period of time I’ve paid a lot of tax and never, ever have I ever had an audit done on 
me, never had any queries, no dramas at all, just the average, law abiding person 
that pays their tax.  
 
In the case of scheme investors, the label ‘tax cheat’ appears to have threatened their 
inclusion in the ‘honest taxpayer’ group. Thus, the reaction of so many investors to defy 
the Tax Office’s request that they pay back taxes appears, in part, to be one of protest at 
being branded a tax cheat. The following quote from an investor who had initially tried to 
pay off their debt seems to sum up the attitude and mindset held by so many scheme 
investors: 
 
In hindsight, I’m glad he [the bank manager] didn’t [give me a loan] because at the 
end of the day I’d much sooner fight, because I still don’t think that I did anything 
wrong.  
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Timeliness 
 
One of the major criticisms of the Tax Office’s handling of the mass marketed schemes 
issue has been their delay in making the decision to crackdown on tax avoidance schemes. 
Investigations into tax minimisation schemes started as early as 1987, yet it was not until 
1998 that the Tax Office actively sought to recover lost revenue from investors involved in 
mass-marketed tax schemes (see Murphy, 2002b; Senate Economics References 
Committee, 2001). This time delay had two important consequences. First, for many 
investors, the tax refunds they received for their initial deductions encouraged them to 
invest in subsequent schemes, thus serving to increase their overall tax debt. As one 
investor said: 
 
That’s just so unfair, they were just negligent, just slack. I mean, there’s obviously a 
better word, but yes, not warning people, because people once they’re told they’re 
okay and they’ve got their deductions. But obviously now they’re telling us that we 
can go back, but the average person doesn’t realise.  
 
Many investors had also sat by for many years watching friends and relatives invest in 
schemes. As one investor said, her sister had been involved in schemes since 1995:  
 
They had been doing it for years, so we thought, by now if it was bad, the 
government would have stopped it.  
 
In 1998 she and her husband invested in a tax scheme that promoted skin care products, 
and as a result subsequently owed the Tax Office thousands of dollars.  
 
The second consequence of the Tax Office’s time delay was that it had the effect of 
magnifying the interest charge levied on participants’ tax debts. This is because the Tax 
Office applied interest from the date the scheme related deduction was initially claimed by 
the taxpayer. This was seen by investors to be particularly unfair, especially by those who 
had invested many years before Tax Office recovery action had started. One investor 
expressed confusion towards the amount she owed the Tax Office:  
 
We were expecting something like $10 000 because I mean really that was all the 
extra sort of cash that did come out of our tax return and when you open this bill for 
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$40 000 I nearly fainted, yeah. I mean how come we had to pay all of a sudden   
$40 000 from $10 000? That part I couldn’t understand. 
 
It became apparent that a large proportion of the $40 000 debt had come from penalties and 
the accrual of interest from the time the deduction had first been claimed. Many investors 
were similarly confused about how the Tax Office had calculated their tax debts. In 
particular, investors were confused and angry about having to pay such large amounts of 
interest because of the Tax Office’s perceived lack of timeliness to identify the problem in 
the first place.7 The majority of investors interviewed therefore indicated that the abolition 
of culpability penalties and interest, as recommended in a Senate report on the matter, 
would be a significant step towards bringing the matter to a close (Senate Economics 
References Committee, 2001). As one investor said:  
 
I would like to see them squash the interest rates, and squash the penalties because 
we didn’t do anything wrong. We bought into something that we thought was going 
to be a good thing, not for the sole purpose of evading tax or cheating the ATO or 
whatever they want to put it these days.  
 
In fact, in February 2002 — four years after action was first taken against scheme investors 
— the Tax Office put forward a final settlement offer in which culpability penalties and 
interest on scheme related tax debts would be abolished for those investors who had been 
the victims of aggressive marketing and bad advice. As part of the deal, investors were 
given a two year interest free period in which to repay their debts. As part of this final 
settlement offer, the Tax Office also thoroughly explained to investors how they could take 
up the offer, what the settlement option meant for them, and respectfully indicated what 
would happen if they did not accept the offer given the outcome of one of the court cases8. 
This offer proved to be highly successful for the Tax Office, with 87 percent of investors 
agreeing to take up the offer. 
 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the anti-avoidance provisions of the Tax Act do allow the Tax Office up to six years 
to disallow a claim. The Tax Office therefore argues that action was taken within the time frame provided by 
the law. 
8 All of these procedures would be considered to be procedurally fair. 
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So why is it that the Tax Office’s most recent strategy worked? Research indicates that 
people are concerned about being well regarded by others. For example, as discussed 
earlier most Australian taxpayers express pride in being a member of the group called 
‘honest taxpayers’. Being accused of purposeful tax avoidance implies dishonesty and 
untrustworthiness, which in turn can be perceived as a threat to one’s reputation. By being 
responsive to scheme investors, and finally giving them some benefit of the doubt (that is, 
that they were victims and not tax cheats), the Tax Office’s gesture acted to bring the 
majority of investors back into the system voluntarily.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
Also of interest to the present study was how negative experiences with authorities can 
shape peoples’ views about the legitimacy of an organisation. As noted in the Introduction 
to this article, if an organisation is perceived to be legitimate then individuals are generally 
more likely to follow and accept their decisions. This has been found to be regardless of 
the decision outcome (see Magner et al., 1998)9. Part of forming an opinion of an 
authority’s legitimacy therefore involves the way individuals feel treated by that authority.  
 
Upon interviewing scheme investors it became apparent that they perceived the Tax 
Office’s initial handling of the schemes issue to be procedurally unfair. This was the case 
even for investors who had already paid any outstanding debts or who had already entered 
into settlement arrangements with the Tax Office. When questioned about how he now 
viewed the Tax Office, one investor said: 
 
Well, I don’t trust them any more. I always thought, you know, if you filled the 
form out properly and you did the right things and went through your normal 
accountant, registered accountant, or whatever, they would just get on with the 
business. But what it has actually alluded to me is that they’re not very well 
organised; they are running a reactionary-mode tax department. 
                                                 
9 Magner et al., (1998) examined the effects of the personal favourability of the outcome of a municipal 
property tax decision, and the fairness of the procedures by which the tax outcome was established, on 
citizens’ reactions toward the municipality and its legislators. It was found that perceptions of procedural 
justice, not outcome favourability, had an effect on citizens’ sense of affiliation with the municipality. It was 
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With many scheme investors questioning the legitimacy of the Tax Office (also see Senate 
Economics References Committee, 2001), the potential for further uncooperative 
behaviour is a real possibility in the future. As discussed in the Introduction to this paper, it 
has been shown that people often seek justice in a number of ways when they feel that the 
group to which they belong has been unfairly treated. As discussed, these ways can include 
political lobbying or turning to third parties to intervene on their behalf. In the case of the 
scheme situation, a number of fighting funds and lobbying groups were set up to represent 
scheme investors’ interests. These fighting funds offered ‘resistant’ investors the chance to 
have their say and the opportunity to fight the Tax Office’s view of the law in court. In 
fact, the fighting funds made the public more aware of their rights, that they were able to 
express their rights and that they could defend them when necessary. In other words, they 
made the public aware that they can challenge the authority of the Tax Office. 
 
A major problem, however, comes from taxpayers who continue to question the legitimacy 
of the Tax Office in years to come and who subsequently choose to disengage from the tax 
system as a result10. Several tax scheme investors interviewed, for example, showed signs 
of more extreme defiance towards the tax system by expressing views that paying tax 
should now be avoided as much as possible. As one investor said:  
 
Every carpenter or plumber or electrician or any of those that I use now, I always 
say to them, ‘How much for cash’. Because I thought, well, stuff it. I’m going to 
stop the Tax Department from getting as much as they can. So I’ll just pay all the 
tradesmen cash. They love it. Beautiful. They don’t have to declare it. And that 
mindset will grow. You know, it’s just my little way of thinking, I’m having a win. 
No worries. I’ll just make you [the ATO] lose a little bit more. 
 
The real threat to the integrity of the tax system comes when disengaged taxpayers such as 
these seek out alternative ways in which they can further exploit the tax system. Such ways 
may include seeking out others who can help them to achieve their purpose. For example, 
the self-assessment system of taxation has given rise to a professional culture that prides 
                                                                                                                                                    
also found that citizens had particularly low levels of resentment towards legislators when the tax outcome 
was favourable and the tax decision-making procedures were perceived to be fair. 
10 This extreme reaction to perceived unjust treatment has been found to occur in a small number of people 
(Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). 
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itself on knowing tax law, how to take advantage of it, and most importantly, on meeting 
customer demand (Braithwaite, 2003; Erard, 1993; Klepper & Nagin, 1989; Klepper, 
Mazur & Nagin, 1991; Murphy, in press; Murphy & Sakurai, 2001; Sakurai & Braithwaite, 
2001). With disgruntled taxpayers questioning the legitimacy of the tax system, the 
opportunity arises for these professionals to position themselves as an alternative authority 
to the Tax Office; an alternative authority that fosters non-compliance (see Braithwaite, 
2003; Murphy, in press; Murphy & Sakurai, 2001).  
 
Research conducted at the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National 
University has in fact shown that these professional groups have captured the psyche of 
many disgruntled taxpayers. In a study of Australian taxpayers, Sakurai and Braithwaite 
(2001) showed that a small number of taxpayers actively seek out aggressive tax agents 
(that is, those that explore the loopholes in the tax law). In a follow up study, Murphy (in 
press) attempted to explain what led taxpayers to seek such advice. It was shown that those 
taxpayers who sought out aggressive tax agents placed less value on the tax system and the 
Tax Office. Compared to taxpayers in general, they were less likely to view the Tax Office 
as a legitimate institution and were more likely to disagree with Tax Office decisions. 
Thus, their tendency to engage in aggressive tax planning was seen to be a reaction 
towards an organisation that they perceived to be illegitimate. Given the degree of anger 
held by so many scheme investors (see Senate Economics References Committee, 2001), a 
major concern to the future integrity of the Australian tax system is whether a large portion 
of these scheme investors will engage in this sort of purposeful tax avoidance in the future. 
This, however, still remains to be seen. 
 
Summary of findings 
 
From the findings presented in this paper, it can be seen that scheme investors were 
concerned about a number of issues in relation to the Tax Office’s handling of the schemes 
issue. These included being concerned about the Tax Office’s failure to identify earlier the 
compliance risks posed by schemes, their initial aggressive use of threat and legal 
coercion, their failure to consider individual investors’ motivations for entering into 
scheme arrangements, their general lack of helpfulness, and their lack of empathy for the 
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financial hardship faced by many investors. Investors were also concerned about being 
thought of as ‘tax cheats’. Finally, it was revealed that the legitimacy of the Tax Office’s 
authority status was also negatively affected because of the way they had treated scheme 
investors. 
 
General discussion 
 
Knowing what motivates people to obey and defer to decisions and rules is very important 
for regulatory authorities. As discussed in the Introduction to this article, the ‘rational 
choice’ model of the individual has previously dominated the formulation of public policy 
in many areas. This view suggests that people are motivated to maximise their personal 
gains and minimise their personal losses. Those advocating such a view therefore believe 
that non-compliance can only be dealt with by handing out harsh sanctions and penalties.  
 
The situation surrounding the mass-marketed tax scheme issue, however, demonstrates that 
the use of threat and legal coercion as a regulatory enforcement tool — in addition to being 
more expensive to implement — can actually be counter-productive (see also Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1990; Murphy, 2002a). The Tax 
Office’s initial use of threat and legal coercion with 42 000 tax scheme investors in fact 
appeared to produce the opposite behaviour from that sought. Instead of complying, the 
majority of tax scheme investors actively resisted the Tax Office’s repeated attempts to 
recover tax owing on their scheme related tax debts.  
 
When attempting to explain why investors did not comply with the Tax Office’s directives 
to pay back tax, the present study showed that perceptions of unfair treatment played a 
very important role in explaining their behaviour. This finding is interesting because it 
indicates that investors were not purely driven by self-interest variables as one might have 
expected, but that they were also strongly concerned about issues of fair treatment and 
respect in forming their opinions about the Tax Office and how they should subsequently 
respond.  
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Implications for regulatory enforcement 
 
So what can regulatory enforcement agencies do in the future to prevent widespread 
resistance towards their decisions and what can they do to ensure that citizens voluntarily 
comply with their obligations? The results of the present study suggest that to effectively 
shape desired behaviour, regulators will need to move beyond enforcement strategies 
linked purely to deterrence. Regulators will instead need to acknowledge the importance of 
procedural justice in their dealings with non-compliant citizens. 
 
Doubts about the effectiveness of a deterrence-based model of enforcement are not new. In 
fact, for the past decade, many contemporary regulatory theorists have been arguing that 
the most effective way in which to achieve genuine acceptance of regulations is not by an 
exclusive reliance upon threat and legal coercion but rather through the use of strategies 
that attempt to bring the best out of those being regulated (for example, Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 1993; Murphy, 2002a; Sparrow, 2000). These theorists 
argue that regulatory agencies risk discouraging civic virtue if they engage in aggressive 
prosecution for relatively minor offences, because those being regulated are likely to feel 
that their past good faith efforts at compliance have not been acknowledged. 
 
Given that people appear to be strongly concerned about issues of fair treatment, neutrality, 
and respect in forming their opinions about the way a regulator handles their situation, a 
strategy that therefore takes into account the problems, motivations, and conditions behind 
non-compliance might prove to be particularly effective in gaining voluntary compliance 
(for a discussion see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001). 
According to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), giving people the opportunity to first 
cooperate voluntarily before escalating to more interventionist forms of regulation is more 
likely to bring a person’s law abiding self to the forefront. As the findings of the present 
study demonstrate, if sanctions or punishments are used as a strategy of first choice and are 
subsequently perceived to be procedurally unjust, regulators run the risk of undermining 
their own legitimacy.  
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This is not to say that sanctions and penalties should not be used at all when dealing with 
non-compliant individuals. There are some people who would take advantage of a 
regulatory strategy based purely on cooperation. Ensuring that there is still the threat of 
punishment in the background for those who resist initial appeals for cooperation will 
reinforce to individuals that a regulator’s attempts at cooperation should be listened to (see 
Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992)11. If such a responsive strategy works, both sides avoid 
expensive enforcement and litigation procedures and more resources will be left to expand 
regulatory coverage. In such a situation, society will gain the benefits of greater 
compliance at a lower cost to the economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While this has not been the first study to show that the use of threat and legal coercion can 
produce the opposite behaviour from that sought, it has been one of the first studies to 
highlight the importance of procedural justice when dealing with non-compliant 
individuals in the taxation context. In particular, the findings from the present study have 
shown that if taxpayers feel poorly treated by a tax authority as a result of their infractions, 
this can lead to them questioning the legitimacy of the tax authority. This can then go on to 
affect their willingness to comply, and can in fact lead to active resistance12. It has been 
proposed here that by using a regulatory strategy based on mutual respect and cooperation 
in the first instance, regulators will be more likely to prevent widespread resistance 
towards their decisions, while at the same time nurturing the good will of those with a 
commitment to compliance. 
                                                 
11 The threat of punishment in the background should not just be an idle threat that never eventuates, but 
should be one that the regulator follows through with if compliance is not forthcoming. Regulators do not 
want to get the reputation of being toothless tigers. 
12 In making these conclusions it is acknowledged that the present study certainly has its limitations, mainly 
due to the small sample size. Any causal relationships made in the paper should therefore be taken with 
caution. It should be noted, however, that findings obtained from a survey of 2292 scheme investors yielded 
similar findings (see Murphy, 2003; Murphy, 2002a; Murphy & Byng, 2002).  
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Appendix 
 
To date, three categories of mass marketed schemes operating in the Australian market 
have been identified by the Tax Office (Australian Taxation Office, 2000). These include: 
(1) round-robin schemes, including non-recourse financing, often in agriculture, 
afforestation and franchises; (2) certain film schemes, with guaranteed returns that are, in 
effect, a return of part of the invested funds; and (3) employee benefit arrangements that 
have tax benefits as their main purpose. It is only the first two types of scheme that are of 
relevance to the present study. 
 
An example of a franchise scheme is ‘Oracle’. Oracle offered investors the opportunity to 
invest in a business that promoted and presented personal development and educational 
workshops. By making an initial cash outlay of $10 000 and borrowing $30 000 from 
Oracle’s financing company, investors could claim an immediate tax deduction of $40 000. 
This would therefore lead to some investors, depending on their original income level, 
receiving a tax refund from the Tax Office of up to $19 400 (Source: Oracle International 
Pty Ltd Prospectus, p. 3). From here, $10 000 of the $19 400 went into paying the initial 
$10 000 set up fee. In some cases, investors were therefore able to pocket the remaining 
$9400.  
 
Several aspects of the investment were of concern to the Tax Office. One major concern 
was that the loan of $30 000 was repayable only from the proceeds of the business. If the 
business made no profit investors would not be required to repay the loan. Therefore, 
unlike many other investments (for example, negative gearing of property), there was no 
risk to the investor. In addition, some scheme investors made a profit from their tax return 
(in some cases the profit was as high as $9400). Another concern for the Tax Office related 
to the nature of the deduction made. Specifically, only a fraction of the $40 000 claimed as 
a tax deduction went into the underlying activity. For many scheme arrangements, the 
majority of the money raised went into financing the management fees. 
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